Shedding light on Turkey’s use of drones in Libya, and why it’s relevant

Di Francesco Calzoni -

Turkey’s intervention in the Libyan civil conflict in January 2020 turned the tides of the war, enabling the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) to break the 18-month Libyan National Army’s (LNA) siege on Tripoli.

The Turkish intervention was based on four main pillars: the deployment of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2 drones, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, air defense systems and two-to-five thousand Syrian mercenaries to support GNA ground forces. Turkish efforts were initially directed at curbing LNA air power and at neutralizing LNA air defenses. LNA air power was dealt with the deployment of radars and Mim-23 Hawk air defense systems at the Mitiga and Misrata airports.

The neutralization of the LNA’s air defenses was achieved via Turkey’s innovative, combined use of TB-2 drones and EW systems as an integrated package. This joint application of the two assets, already experimented in Syria, was further developed in Libya and enabled the GNA to achieve complete air superiority in Tripolitania, overturning the balance of power of the conflict.

The TB-2 was already present in the Libyan theater in 2019, but its impact on the battlespace was very limited due to the LNA’s air defenses. Starting from January 2020, the deployment of Turkish EW systems made the TB-2s invisible to the Russian-made Pantsir S-1 air defense systems at the disposal of the LNA. The Pantsir S-1 is a component of the layered air defense bubble protecting Russian regular forces deployed at Latakia airbase in Syria, thus a very capable system. Although there is no complete clarity on how the Turkish EW systems work, they are either able to confuse the radars of the Pantsir, or to hide the electronic signature of the TB-2. In any case, the EW systems were used to “blind” the LNA’s Pantsirs, allowing the rather slow TB-2s to strike and neutralize an unconfirmed number of these estimated to be above six.   

This produced a cascade effect on the Tripolitania battlespace, removing the constraints to the full use of the TB-2’s capabilities. GNA forces became able to benefit from the drone’s sensors to conduct ISR missions, obtain intelligence and acquire targets. The TB-2 is also armed with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle MAM-L and MAM-C missiles which targeted LNA military posts, command and control positions, supply lines, armored vehicles, ground units. This put substantial pressure on the LNA, slowing down its military operations and disrupting its logistics, resulting in a collapse of LNA frontlines in Tripolitania.

Why is this relevant? Because thanks to EW systems, a small, slow and relatively cheap drone can now neutralize expensive air defense systems and deliver critical air superiority (with the consequent broader military advantage) to its operator. The integrated use of EW systems and TB-2 drones enabled Turkey to overturn the balance of power of the Libyan conflict, elevating the TB-2 and the EW systems from being tactical resources when used individually to a strategic capability and key enabler when combined.

Turkish drone pilots can conduct these missions sitting comfortably in an air-conditioned airbase without running any risk apart from possibly losing the drone, which makes the decision whether to undertake such operations almost a no-brainer for the military commander. All the hardware and software of the TB-2, including ammunition, are produced domestically, which makes each single drone less costly and more expendable, and spare parts always available and easy to procure.

These applications seem to have created an asymmetry between air power and air defense in the Libyan context. To be fair, we should mention that LNA air defenses were probably operated by Libyan forces who lacked proper training. However, Turkey is expected to make more leaps forward in the years to come, for example developing the technical infrastructure to operate EW assets in coordination with drone swarms and artificial intelligence. It should also be noted that Turkey produces other more advanced and capable drones than the TB-2, for example the ANKA-S and the Aksungur, which can carry much heavier payloads and operate beyond line of sight thanks to their SATCOM link, which the TB-2 does not have. In the future, the broad application of these game-changing capabilities by more actors and in more theaters would probably impose a rethinking of how current military operations are conducted.

 

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

THE TAPERING OF THE QE: RISKS AND POSSIBLE FALLOUTS FOR ITALY (2nd part)

Di -
Image
Here's the link to the the first part This second part of the article wants to enact the worst-case scenario for Italy: the likelihood of a default in light of a reduction of stimulus program by ECB. At first, the conditions of the Eurozone seem pretty stable and the macroeconomic outlook, even considering political risk, is far from 2010. Populist parties have been sidelined during the last elections in France and UK. In Germany, a stream of positive economic data is accompanied by political uncertainty over Chancellor Merkel’s ability to form a coalition government: however, the turmoil is unlikely to have serious repercussions. Spain is regaining focus, notwithstanding the political stand-off between the Central government and Catalan authorities. Greece is no longer in dire straits and is slowly recovering: the Hellenic country has just held its first bond sale since 2014. Growth has gained steam in most of European countries over the last 2 years. In
Read more

THE TAPERING OF THE QE: RISKS AND POSSIBLE FALLOUTS FOR ITALY (1st part)

Di -
Image
In light of tapering of the Quantitative Easing, this script intends to investigate whether and to what extent ECB’s unconventional monetary policy has affected Italy’s economy over the last 5 years . In doing so, the script aims at shedding light on the mechanisms and procedures that affect country risk assessment and consequently the measurement of sovereign risk premium incorporated by sovereign debt. Thus, this part will go over the last decade to present a clear picture of the ECB’s Asset Purchase Program. Then, the paper wants to enact the worst-case scenario for Italy , namely the likelihood of a default afterward the end of QE. Therefore, this work carefully presents the distortions and macroeconomic imbalances of Italy’s economy through which a major debt-crisis could break out. Above all high level of debt to GDP ratio and inability to meet debt obligations, infringement of Maastricht criteria in terms of deficit-to-GDP ratio, sluggish productivity and lethargic growth.
Read more

WHO DID (NOT) KILL KOSOVO SERB LEADER OLIVER IVANOVIC?

Di Francesco Calzoni -
Image
On Tuesday, January 16, Oliver Ivanovic was shot dead in Mitrovica, in the Northern part of Kosovo. It was the climax of a series of attacks directed against him and his family. His car was set on fire twice, in 2005 and then in July 2017. Serbian media also reported that in September 2013, ahead of the local elections, an unknown man entered Ivanovic’s apartment and attacked his wife. The same year, someone started a fire in his party headquarters. Ivanovic’s moderate political posture, advocating for dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, encountered the opposition of the nationalist factions of the two countries. He was the head of a civil initiative called Freedom, Democracy, Justice, and acted as an opponent to the main Serb party in Kosovo, Srpska Lista, which is now part of the Kosovo government.  Ivanovic was also on probation for his supposed complicity in war crimes, committed in 1999 against ethnic Albanians. Indeed, he had a lot of enemies. Following his assas
Read more