Lessons Learned From the 2003 Transatlantic Divide
The 2003 Transatlantic divide over the decision
to go to war in Iraq carries three lessons that the United States and its
European counterparts should bear in mind to avoid new ruptures. First, the U.S.A. and European countries
should not try to deviate from the rules of international law they have agreed
to. Second, although the credibility of NATO was put at stake, the alliance
proved solid even in a time of crisis. Third, the soundness of the
Transatlantic partnership should never be taken for granted and should constantly
be nurtured.
The decision over whether to overthrow the
Bathist regime in Iraq sparked an intense political debate. On one side, the
United States advocated for immediate military action to overthrow Saddam. Behind
this lay America’s sense of vulnerability after the 9/11 attacks, its
overwhelming military power and the belief in its “ability to change the world.”[1]
The United States could also count on the support of numerous European allies; more
specifically, the Vilnius 10[2]
and those who signed the so-called “Letter of the Eight.”[3] On
the other side stood France and Germany. France favored a diplomatic solution
to the crisis and defended the supreme authority of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) in providing the legal basis for any military action, although
without dismissing the possibility of a intervention. Germany excluded the
possibility of military intervention in Iraq, due to domestic political considerations
linked to Schroeder’s re-election.
The political debate escalated into a diplomatic
crackup in late 2002 and early 2003. The main issue was the interpretation of
the UNSC Resolution 1441, which reflected the different approaches that the United
States and France wanted to adopt vis-a-vis Iraq.[4] On
the one hand, the United States considered a failure in Iraq’s compliance with
this resolution an automatic authorization to intervene militarily, even though
Resolution 1441 did not explicitly authorize the use of force. On the other
hand, France deemed necessary a new Chapter VII resolution authorizing the use
of military force before any military action.
The first lesson that we can draw from the 2003
crackup is that deviations from the rules of international law will inevitably
create divisions within the alliance. The UN Charter, undersigned by both the
U.S.A. and France, set the standards of behavior to be kept on the
international arena. When one evades these standards, one automatically finds
himself in opposition to the other signatories, creating a cleavage. Moreover,
not complying with those standards establishes a precedent that legitimizes geopolitical
competitors to behave in the same way, creating the potential for further
divisions. Had the U.S.A. supported a
resolution under Article 42 of the UN Charter, France would not have resisted
American plans. In fact, France did not exclude the possibility of a military
intervention in Iraq; it just set a series of necessary conditions for it to
happen, such as a “blatant Iraqi obstruction of weapons inspectors,” “the
discovery of a “smoking gun” too important to ignore”[5] and
a new UNSC Resolution under Article 42 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[6]
For this reason, the Transatlantic crackup
could be avoided if the United States tried to follow the conventional
diplomatic path. It is true that Russia and China could still veto a Chapter
VII resolution approving the use of force in Iraq; however, this would not have
split the alliance. Instead, the Bush administration tried to bend the rules
arguing that Resolution 1441 authorized it to intervene. When this diplomatic posture
proved harder to maintain than expected, the Bush administration decided to
intervene in Iraq without the legal backing of the UN and before that the UN
weapons inspectors Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei reported back to the UNSC. This
made clear to France that neither its opinion nor the authority of the UNSC
counted for the U.S. administration. The unilateral approach eventually adopted
by the United States, however, is partially justified by the deep sense of
threat felt in Washington with regards to Saddam’s WMD program.[7]
The second lesson is that transferring the
political stalemate into the NATO framework put at stake the integrity of the
alliance but also made clear its solidity. Surely, the United States placed a
successful bet when it called for Article 4 of the NATO Charter to protect
Turkey from a potential Iraqi retaliation.[8] The choice that the United States proposed to
France, Germany and the other NATO members was basically between giving the
consent to contingency planning, which indirectly meant legitimizing an
intervention, or undermining the credibility of the alliance. Indeed, NATO
displayed credibility and cohesiveness in a critical moment, remaining united.
However, this diplomatic strategy entailed several collateral damages. For
example, by adopting this stance, the Bush administration implicitly accepted
the risk of tearing NATO apart, setting a dangerous precedent. Besides, France
and Germany interpreted the United States’ negotiation strategy as a political
blackmail. Second, by calling for defensive contingency planning, Washington
gave to its European allies the sense that the United States had already
decided to intervene against Iraq and that disregarded their opinion. As Belgian
Foreign Minister Louis Michel put it, NATO plans to defend Turkey from an Iraqi
retaliation signified that the alliance had “already entered into the logic of
war, that any chance, any initiative to still resolve the conflict in a
peaceful way was gone.”[9]
The third and last lesson is that the soundness
of the Transatlantic axis must never be taken for granted. This is especially
important today, in a moment when the United States, Canada and Europe face
substantial threats including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, Russia’s
political warfare (which precisely targets our political and social cleavages)
and China’s economic competition. To respond to these threats, the United
States and the EU should upgrade their dialogue on economic and geopolitical
issues and work together to pursue their shared interests. Although part of the
same civilization, NATO members all differ from each other regarding culture,
military prowess and strategic priorities.
Meaning, divisions will arise among and within them also in the future.
However, it is up to them to mitigate those divisions in the only possible way:
abiding by international law and making their diplomatic relations more agile
and responsive to each other’s concerns. Even more, it is up to them to leverage
on their diversity as an asset, rather than framing it as a weakness.
[1] Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro. Allies at war: America, Europe, and the
crisis over Iraq. McGraw-Hill Companies (2004). p. 156
[2] Mihaela Gherghisan, “Vilnius 10 sign letter on Iraq”, euobserver, February 6, 2003 Available
at: https://euobserver.com/enlargement/9269
Accessed on April 10,
2018
[3] Marc Champion, “Eight European Leaders Voice Their Support for U.S. on
Iraq”, The Wall Street Journal, January
30, 2003 Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1043875470158445104
Accessed on April 10,
2018
[4] The full text of the UNSC Resolution 1441 is available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2002/SC7564.doc.htm
Accessed on April 9,
2018
[5] Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro. Allies
at war: America, Europe, and the crisis over Iraq. McGraw-Hill Companies (2004).
p. 142
[6] The full text of Chapter VII of the UN Charter is available at https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/ Accessed on April 9, 2018
[7] Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro. Allies
at war: America, Europe, and the crisis over Iraq. McGraw-Hill Companies (2004).
p. 83
[8] The NATO Charter is available at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm
Accessed on April 9,
2018
[9] Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro. Allies
at war: America, Europe, and the crisis over Iraq. McGraw-Hill Companies,
2004. p. 138
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