Shedding light on Turkey’s use of drones in Libya, and why it’s relevant
Turkey’s intervention in the Libyan civil conflict in January 2020 turned the tides of the war, enabling the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) to break the 18-month Libyan National Army’s (LNA) siege on Tripoli.
The Turkish intervention was based on four main pillars: the deployment
of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2 drones, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities,
air defense systems and two-to-five thousand Syrian mercenaries to support GNA
ground forces. Turkish efforts were initially directed at curbing LNA air power
and at neutralizing LNA air defenses. LNA air power was dealt with the
deployment of radars and Mim-23 Hawk air defense systems at the Mitiga and
Misrata airports.
The neutralization of the LNA’s air defenses was achieved via Turkey’s innovative,
combined use of TB-2 drones and EW systems as an integrated package. This joint
application of the two assets, already experimented in Syria, was further
developed in Libya and enabled the GNA to achieve complete air superiority in Tripolitania,
overturning the balance of power of the conflict.
The TB-2 was already present in the Libyan theater in 2019, but its
impact on the battlespace was very limited due to the LNA’s air defenses. Starting
from January 2020, the deployment of Turkish EW systems made the TB-2s
invisible to the Russian-made Pantsir S-1 air defense systems at the disposal
of the LNA. The Pantsir S-1 is a component of the layered air defense bubble
protecting Russian regular forces deployed at Latakia airbase in Syria, thus a
very capable system. Although there is no complete clarity on how the Turkish
EW systems work, they are either able to confuse the radars of the Pantsir, or
to hide the electronic signature of the TB-2. In any case, the EW systems were
used to “blind” the LNA’s Pantsirs, allowing the rather slow TB-2s to strike
and neutralize an unconfirmed number of these estimated to be above six.
This produced a cascade effect on the Tripolitania battlespace, removing
the constraints to the full use of the TB-2’s capabilities. GNA forces became
able to benefit from the drone’s sensors to conduct ISR missions, obtain
intelligence and acquire targets. The TB-2 is also armed with both
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle MAM-L and MAM-C missiles which targeted LNA
military posts, command and control positions, supply lines, armored vehicles,
ground units. This put substantial pressure on the LNA, slowing down its
military operations and disrupting its logistics, resulting in a collapse of
LNA frontlines in Tripolitania.
Why is this relevant? Because thanks to EW systems, a small, slow and
relatively cheap drone can now neutralize expensive air defense systems and deliver
critical air superiority (with the consequent broader military advantage) to
its operator. The integrated use of EW systems and TB-2 drones enabled Turkey
to overturn the balance of power of the Libyan conflict, elevating the TB-2 and
the EW systems from being tactical resources when used individually to a
strategic capability and key enabler when combined.
Turkish drone pilots can conduct these missions sitting comfortably in
an air-conditioned airbase without running any risk apart from possibly losing
the drone, which makes the decision whether to undertake such operations almost
a no-brainer for the military commander. All the hardware and software of the
TB-2, including ammunition, are produced domestically, which makes each single
drone less costly and more expendable, and spare parts always available and
easy to procure.
These applications seem to have created an asymmetry between air power and air defense in the Libyan context. To be fair, we should mention that LNA air defenses were probably operated by Libyan forces who lacked proper training. However, Turkey is expected to make more leaps forward in the years to come, for example developing the technical infrastructure to operate EW assets in coordination with drone swarms and artificial intelligence. It should also be noted that Turkey produces other more advanced and capable drones than the TB-2, for example the ANKA-S and the Aksungur, which can carry much heavier payloads and operate beyond line of sight thanks to their SATCOM link, which the TB-2 does not have. In the future, the broad application of these game-changing capabilities by more actors and in more theaters would probably impose a rethinking of how current military operations are conducted.
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