QuickAssessments

  The 2003 Transatlantic divide over the decision to go to war in Iraq carries three lessons that the United States and its European counterparts should bear in mind to avoid new ruptures. First, the U.S.A. and European countries should not try to deviate from the rules of international law they have agreed to. Second, although the credibility of NATO was put at stake, the alliance proved solid even in a time of crisis. Third, the soundness of the Transatlantic partnership should never be taken for granted and should constantly be nurtured. The decision over whether to overthrow the Bathist regime in Iraq sparked an intense political debate. On one side, the United States advocated for immediate military action to overthrow Saddam. Behind this lay America’s sense of vulnerability after the 9/11 attacks, its overwhelming military power and the belief in its “ability to change the world.” [1] The United States could also count on the support of numerous European allies; mor

Sticking to its policy on Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR), the U.S. Government faces an unnerving dilemma: does saving an American life today offset risking to lose more in the future? Although this might sound like a cynical oversimplification, the answer of the U.S. Government is: no. In fact, the idea that ransoms enable criminal groups to fund their operations and in turn threaten the United States is what motivates the U.S. Government not to pay. The second argument that supports this policy is the belief that paying ransoms sparks a vicious circle where ransoms lead to more kidnappings. The U.S. Government needs to rethink its KFR policy because these arguments are not as solid as they seem. The idea that refusing to pay ransoms prevents American citizens from being kidnapped is a myth. The fact that radical Islamist groups capture Americans even though they are aware of the U.S.A.’s no-ransom policy demonstrates that the motivation of the crime is political, not economic. S