QuickAssessments

  The 2003 Transatlantic divide over the decision to go to war in Iraq carries three lessons that the United States and its European counterparts should bear in mind to avoid new ruptures. First, the U.S.A. and European countries should not try to deviate from the rules of international law they have agreed to. Second, although the credibility of NATO was put at stake, the alliance proved solid even in a time of crisis. Third, the soundness of the Transatlantic partnership should never be taken for granted and should constantly be nurtured. The decision over whether to overthrow the Bathist regime in Iraq sparked an intense political debate. On one side, the United States advocated for immediate military action to overthrow Saddam. Behind this lay America’s sense of vulnerability after the 9/11 attacks, its overwhelming military power and the belief in its “ability to change the world.” [1] The United States could also count on the support of numerous European allies; mor

Sticking to its policy on Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR), the U.S. Government faces an unnerving dilemma: does saving an American life today offset risking to lose more in the future? Although this might sound like a cynical oversimplification, the answer of the U.S. Government is: no. In fact, the idea that ransoms enable criminal groups to fund their operations and in turn threaten the United States is what motivates the U.S. Government not to pay. The second argument that supports this policy is the belief that paying ransoms sparks a vicious circle where ransoms lead to more kidnappings. The U.S. Government needs to rethink its KFR policy because these arguments are not as solid as they seem. The idea that refusing to pay ransoms prevents American citizens from being kidnapped is a myth. The fact that radical Islamist groups capture Americans even though they are aware of the U.S.A.’s no-ransom policy demonstrates that the motivation of the crime is political, not economic. S

Government control of the information space is one of the main features that characterize underdeveloped democracies. Under this aspect, Russia is no exception: the tradition of government control over the media and public opinion is rooted in Russian history and culture. Over history, the tsarist and communist regimes strived to prevent political dissent from being diffused through the press, in order to maintain a strong grip on society. Even after the collapse of the USSR the situation did not change substantially, although Art. 29 of the Russian constitution upheld freedom of speech and information. [1] In parallel to the political transformations triggered by the collapse of the USSR, mass media were also evolving thanks to the rise of the internet. Russian intelligence services, stuck in a Soviet mindset and facing a highly volatile domestic political environment, understood the internet’s potential to diffuse information and felt the need to control it. [2] Simply put